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CSR, Human Rights Abuse and Sustainability Report Accountability 
INTRODUCTION
It is trite that activities of corporations, especially in developing countries, have resulted in serious human rights abuses. In Africa, this is particularly so with regard to extractive industries’ operations, the nature and scale of which is well documented (United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), 2011; Owusu-Koranteng, 2004; Lissu, 1999; Hazelton, 1999). This sector still attracts the most foreign investment into the continent (UNCTAD 2012) and is therefore, dominated by multinational companies. This paper includes environmental pollution and degradation as an integral, and indeed, significant aspect of corporate human rights abuses both in its own right and also as a precursor to other socio-economic, health, political and civil rights abuses. Despite the continuing debate on the existence of a separate recognisable environmental right at international law (Fitzmaurice & Marshal, 2007), this is less so within the context of Africa. The matter appears quite settled with the recognition in Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981) of “the right to a general satisfactory environment ...” and decisions of the African Human Rights Commission in cases such as SERAC v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2000)​[1]​ and the Nigerian Federal High Court in Gbemre v. Shell (2005)​[2]​. Furthermore, while specifics differ, the environmental dimension of extractive industries and human rights abuses across Africa are similar. Both in the mining and petroleum sectors, lack of proper environmental management practices (UNEP, 2011; Owusu-Koranteng, 2004; Lissu, 1999;) has implications not just for the natural environment, but also the health and socio-economic rights of local communities owing to their dependence on the natural environment for needs and livelihoods.  Protests against such pollution are often met with force from state security agents, allegedly with complicity from corporations, thus giving rise to civil and political rights abuses. Often, victims have no legal redress owing to inadequate national regulatory and enforcement frameworks.  These inadequacies stem from factors such as capacity deficits, governance challenges; and lack of political will to stringently regulate economically strategic industries (Emeseh, 2006). 
For these countries, there was much expectation that CSR touted as being over and above what the law provides would help address these issues (Ward, 2008) through companies voluntarily adopting appropriate environmental management, respect for human rights, and adherence to international labour standards. However, the promise of CSR filling the regulatory vacuum has remained largely unfulfilled (Emeseh, 2009; Feeney, 2001). Despite the burgeoning of various voluntary initiatives (The Global Compact; Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights; Kimberly Process; and Sullivan Principles) and corporate codes affirming a commitment to CSR, there is little evidence of alleviation of these issues especially within the environmental context. A UNEP study of oil pollution in Ogoni in the Niger Delta found high levels of pollution with significant health implications for the local communities; and remediation which did not meet even the standards set by the company, Shell. (UNEP, 2011)  Similarly, recent reports from both Zambia and Ghana allege continuing environmental and other rights abuses (Boateng, 2012; Anane 2011; The African Report, 2012). 
Yet, in line with their avowed commitment to CSR, companies routinely publish glowing reports on their activities in these countries (SPDC, 2006). It is unfortunately not always easy to check the veracity of claims owing to lack of reliable data or information from regulatory agencies in these countries. Nevertheless, there is evidence that companies’ sustainability reports may not always reflect the truth about their operations. For instance, Emel, Makene and Wangari (2012) found that AngloGold Ashanti’s reports (from 2004 – 2007)   describing community development projects undertaken in two communities in Tanzania were ‘misleading, ambiguous, and omissive’ (2012, p.257).  Further, data obtained from field research conducted  in 2005, 2007, and 2010  revealed that projects labelled in the company’s reports  as ‘community development projects’ for water and food supplies, health and education were actually company-oriented projects for the direct benefit of the company.
Moreover, even where claims are found to be false, there are no binding at both national and transnational levels for holding companies accountable for the contents of these reports. Part of this difficulty lies in the failure to move CSR beyond voluntarism and self-regulation. As Ward opines, “... the definitional insistence that ‘CSR is only about voluntary action ...’ and the consequent separation of ‘CSR’ and ‘corporate accountability’ serves no one well …”. Corporate accountability is therefore crucial for the effectiveness of CSR, and in the interests of all stakeholders. 
Despite calls in some quarters, it is unlikely, at least in the short term that CSR will be placed on a binding legal platform. This paper therefore explores the possibility of a compromise within which a voluntary CSR framework, creatively uses information voluntarily put out in the public domain as a mechanism for corporate accountability. The paper argues that as with misstatements in financial reports, companies should be held liable for inaccurate statements made knowingly or negligently in companies’ sustainability reports or other corporate publicity documents as a form of information regulation. The paper comprises four main sections. Following this introduction, the next section charts the use of sustainability reports by companies, highlights their shortcomings and demonstrates the potential for their use as a form of information regulation. Thereafter, various frameworks at both national and transnational levels through which information regulation through sustainability reports could be utilised are explored. The final section is the conclusion. 
Sustainability Reporting- Issues and context 
External reporting of companies’ non-financial reports started as a response to demands for more transparency and accountability about environmental issues in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it was in the late 1980s, following such disasters as the Bhopal gas leak in India and the consequent public outcry that the first stand-alone environmental performance reports were published. In the relatively short time since, there have been significant developments in three key areas in trends and patterns of reporting: increased number of reports, more comprehensive coverage of issues, and attempts at standardization/benchmarking. Indeed the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), currently the most widely used reporting guidelines states its vision to be “that disclosure on economic, environmental, and social performance is as commonplace and comparable as financial reporting …”
However, despite the huge steps that have been made, there are a number of criticisms. One of these is the argument that the term sustainability reports is inappropriate in light of strict interpretations of sustainability. For instance, Gray and Milne (2002) contend that sustainability reporting implies going beyond the impacts of a single organisation’s interactions with ecosystems, resources, and communities to the impacts of other past and present organisations on those same systems. In their opinion a better terminology might be the triple bottom line reporting on financial, environmental and social activities of a company. While this argument has merit, appropriate labelling of these documents is not central to this paper. Consequently, for purposes of uniformity, and in line with the general literature and reports, this paper adopts the term ‘sustainability report’.
More germane to this paper are critiques of the accuracy and credibility of information contained in these reports which it is argued are generally not subjected to rigorous auditing processes and little more than public relations documents. There is undoubtedly a sound basis for such criticisms. As evidenced in Ernst & Young’s study (2009), which supports an earlier study by Walden and Schwartz (1997), companies report mainly favourable information rather than a balanced account of both positive and negative aspects of their performances.  The survey reveals that 76% of the reports contained mainly positive data with hardly any negative disclosures; only 43% of reports addressed all social issues that generated media attention on the organisation; and only 36% of reports include or discuss stakeholder criticisms. The finding is particularly revealing when one considers that these are reports from some of the leading companies in Europe with arguably better reporting standards than those in emerging countries such as Brazil (Global Researchers, 2008). Other factors which further lend credence to criticisms of reports include the non-use of standardized forms of reporting and credible external auditing, even though both of these are required or recommended by most reporting guidelines, including the GRI; and confirmed examples of “greenwashing” by companies. This has led some to argue that social and environmental reporting by companies will only become useful if it is mandated under legislation with clear requirements and criteria (Gray & Milne, 2002).
However, while acknowledging these limitations and shortcomings, this paper posits that in light of the stakeholder and legitimacy theories, information from these reports can be useful for various stakeholders such as environmentalists, the media, and even competitors, as a basis for challenging specific corporate claims, possibly even through the formal legal system as an indirect form of informational regulation. This argument is developed further below. 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING: DEVELOPMENTS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The increase in numbers of companies producing sustainability reports in a relatively short time has been acknowledged by commentators as nothing less than dramatic or phenomenal. Figures available from CorporateRegister.com, which has the largest database on such reports, show that while only a handful of companies mainly in the chemical and oil and gas industries had such reports in 1992, this has now increased to well over 3000 from a broad range of industry sectors (CorporateRegister.com, 2012). This accounts for stand-alone reports only and does not include instances where non-financial disclosures may be contained in other forms of company documents or websites. The majority of reports are from Europe, although trends show notable increased levels of reporting in most other regions of the world except Africa and the Middle East.  Also, reports now cover a much broader scope than simply environmental issues. So, whereas the environment accounted for 80 percent (80%) of output of such reports in 1992, by 2008, this had dropped to about 15 percent (15%) only. These newer sustainability reports which have evolved from environmental performance reports, are considered to be a more holistic approach to providing non-financial information about corporations by evidencing a company’s systemic and systematic management of not just environmental concerns, but the core issues covered by Corporate Social Responsibility such as labour, health and safety, human rights, business ethics, and other socio-economic concerns or impacts of operations.  
Significant steps have been taken towards addressing one of the main criticisms of these reports: - standardizing performance indicators and general guidelines for reporting in order to facilitate or enhance greater comparability of reports.  Attempts to provide such a framework either generally or for specific sectors took off pretty early. However, not until recently, following the establishment of the GRI that there appears to be a relatively broad based acceptance and use of a uniform set of reporting guidelines. Thus while in a survey by KPMG (KPMG, 1999), there was only 5% reported use of any specific guidelines, in 2009, Corporate Register.com reports that about a third of reports adopted the GRI guidelines. The smaller survey by Enst & Young (2009) gives an even higher figure of 81%, although this may be understandable because of the pool from which it drew its sample. 
In the face of these important developments in sustainability reporting, it is interesting to note that corporate reporting started on a voluntary basis by companies, and grew within a framework of voluntary opt in schemes which either required (such as the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EU EMAS)) or recommended (such as International Standards Organisation (ISO)) reporting. This dominance of non-regulation is particularly interesting when it is noted that one of the key drivers for external environmental reporting was the US 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right to-Know Act which following the Bhopal gas leak required specified companies to submit annual data to the Environmental Protection Agency on release of certain toxic chemicals. Reporting still essentially occurs within a framework of voluntarism, although the number and nature of voluntary initiatives, guidelines and guidance have grown over the years (UNEP/KPMG, 2006). However, some of the more recent initiatives such as the IFP’s Equator Principles and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Socially Responsible Investment Index (JSE/SRI Index) arguably have significant implications for corporations’ traditional core focus on business growth and shareholder value. 
While sustainability reporting did grow within a voluntary framework, lack of mandatory requirements for and standards in reporting, it has been suggested, is the reason why “it is neither practised systematically by organizations nor able to claim either universal recognition or universal definition” (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers, 1995; Nahal, 2002). The trend, especially since the turn of the century in certain regions and jurisdictions (EU, US, Australia, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and France, Japan) has been towards increasingly requiring varying degrees of mandatory non-financial reporting (UNEP/KPMG, 2006). As criticisms over quality of reports continue, it is likely that this practice may become more widespread, and conditions more stringent in those already requiring mandatory reporting. For instance, in November 2007 Sweden published new “Guidelines for external reporting by state-owned companies” and announced a mandatory requirement for all state owned companies to file an annual sustainability report based on the GRI-G3) Guidelines before the 31 March each year, from 2009 (GR Press Resources, 2007).
However, whether or not mandatory reporting requirements will in itself substantially improve the quality of reports is debatable. Studies examining reports in Norway, Australia and France, all countries where there are mandatory reporting requirements, reveal that strict compliance with the relevant laws were quite low. Vormedal and Ruud (2006) found from their survey of reports from the 100 largest companies in Norway that only 10% of reports complied strictly with legal environmental reporting requirements. Similarly, Utopies, SustainAbility & UNEP (2005) found that not only smaller companies, but as many as 20 of the 120 companies on the SBF 120 Index (the most actively traded stocks listed in Paris), completely ignored the reporting requirements. Of those that did attempt to comply, two thirds reported on less than 40% of the required indicators. Finding similar non-compliance in Australia, Bubna-Litic (2008) posits that optimal reporting in accordance with the guidelines can only be achieved where there is effective enforcement by a regulatory authority. However lack of specificity with regard to indicators and reporting guidelines could also be faulted for poor compliance (Baue, 2002). This would explain Sweden’s initiative to specify use of the GRI guidelines.  
If corporations are not complying fully with mandatory requirements, why then is the number of sustainability reports even under a voluntary framework growing? Understanding the rationale for corporate decision to publish these reports is a helpful indicator of how relevant stakeholders could meaningfully use the information contained therein for their own ends. 
WHY DO COMPANIES REPORT?
Corporate motivations, and indeed the theoretical underpinnings for sustainability reporting, especially within a voluntary framework has long been an interest of researchers in the fields of accounting, management and business ethics (Ullmann, 1985; Puxty, 1986). However, Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995) note in their review of the literature on the subject, that there has not been any “agreed theoretical perspective” in the analysis of sustainability reporting. This is perhaps understandable considering sustainability reporting straddles various academic fields; issues are relatively novel; their precise nature and scope inherently contestable; and its core ideas challenge established understandings about the role and obligation of corporate entities. For instance, according to Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995), there is an inherent conflict between the issues raised in sustainability reporting which appear to highlight the failure of the free market in addressing the injustices of corporate action on ordinary citizens while pure economic accounting theories are predicated upon the success of free markets. 
Despite the plurality of academic interests and conceptual paradigms, two dominant theoretical approaches - the stakeholder and legitimacy theories - emerge in the literature. Although separate theories, they are not necessarily competing theories but rather overlap and reinforce one another. While there are varying views or interpretations of the stakeholder theory and its implementation in practice, at its core is the move away from the narrow conventional view of the firm with its focus on shareholder value, towards one which takes account of the interests of all its relevant stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston 1995; Mitchell & Agle, 1997). Within this context, sustainability reporting demonstrates a company’s recognition of their obligation to a wider group of relevant stakeholders, and their entitlement to information about issues concerning them in much the same way as the shareholders are entitled to financial information about the company. Aguilera & Jackson (2003) suggest that the influence of the stakeholder theory on sustainability reporting can perhaps be seen in the higher numbers of reporting companies and more comprehensive mandatory reporting requirements in European countries such as Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, where a stakeholder concept of the firm has been most dominant.
Although, there are inherently ethical underpinnings to this theory, a stakeholder approach to management is essential for the survival and free operation of corporations. This is underscored by the impact that certain stakeholder activities such as negative campaigns by environmental and human rights groups, boycott of goods/products by consumers, and disruption of operations by local communities, have on productivity, profitability and share value of the companies affected. This would also explain why it was especially larger companies with well-known corporate identity and reputation in certain industries facing a crisis of trust with critical stakeholder groups who took the lead in sustainability reporting. Sustainability reporting becomes a useful tool for fostering dialogue between the company and its stakeholders. Here, the stakeholder analysis of motivations for sustainability reporting merges and overlaps with the legitimacy theory.
Analysis of corporate motivations based on the legitimacy theory sees reporting as a strategy adopted by companies to legitimise actions which management perceives as potentially or actually detrimental to its reputation, with possible implications for its profitability and ultimate survival.  According to Lindblom (1994), when there is a crisis of or threat to legitimacy between “an entity’s value system … [with that] of the larger social system of which the entity is a part [owing to] a disparity, actual or potential … between the two value systems, that entity may adopt one or all of four approaches to seek legitimation depending on the cause of the “legitimacy gap”. These strategies include information about actual changes within the organisation in recognition of and response to failures within the organisation that led to the “legitimacy gap”; changing perceptions that led to the “legitimacy gap” where they are believed to be misconceptions by the organisation; deflecting attention from the issue causing the “legitimacy gap” by addressing other issues (essentially reframing the focus of the discourse); and finally, seeking to change or lower expectations where the organisation believes these to be either not legitimate or realistic.   Each of these strategies involves information management with its relevant public- evident in sustainability reports. 
Whichever of these theories one subscribes to, it is safe to conclude that it is important to these companies to demonstrate their commitment to sustainability principles to relevant stakeholders through sustainability reports. Unless one believes that the motivation for this is purely ethical and/or altruistic, the obvious conclusion to be drawn from the largely voluntary uptake is the corporate advantage derivable from making such reports. Inherent in this corporate motivation for voluntary sustainability reporting is its potential as a means for indirect regulation- either through the formal legal system or indirectly by bringing pressure to bear on companies to change their attitudes.
To do so, one has to move the analysis away from a focus on the organisation’s use of information as a strategy for creating legitimacy and accountability in the minds of the stakeholders to a focus on the stakeholder and their use of information as a strategy for holding businesses accountable. In truth, this is not really a new paradigm. Corporations have for long had mandatory financial disclosure requirements - a strategy of informational regulation. More recently, economic and legal discourses on optimal environmental regulation of corporations highlight the utility of public disclosure of information as a potentially valuable means of indirect regulation, and a complement to the conventional and often criticised dominance of the command and control approach (Jacobson, 2003; Case, 2001; Vandenbergh, 2004). Informational regulation operates through creating incentives for change in behaviour and attitudes of the company owing to pressure from relevant stakeholders. According to Case (2005:383), “market forces unleashed by public information disclosure create incentives for self-regulation not provided by traditional regulatory approaches”
The pivotal role of the public’s access to information as a useful environmental law regulatory tool was recognised by Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration which underlies the binding UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) 1998. Principle 10 clearly states the rationale for “making information widely available” as being to “facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation …” Clearly, the focus of the Principle is on the responsibility of States, not corporations, to make available environmental information in their custody, and participation as envisaged therein is a much broader, complex concept. Nevertheless, there is ample scope for informational regulation through pressure owing to such information being made publicly available. For instance, the TRI in the US, was hailed as a successful example of informational regulation owing to very significant voluntary reductions in reported emissions (48% over a 12 year period according to the EPA). This flowed in part from the availability of the information in the custody of the EPA to the public and the consequent pressure this brought to bear on the companies (U.S.EPA, 2002; Wolf, 1996). The negative pressures from this publicly available information also influenced the growth of sustainability reporting as companies, using legitimation strategies identified by Lindblom, published stand-alone environmental reports painting a more positive picture of their environmental performance (KPMG 1999). A recent example of the power of such negative information is the decision by Starbucks to pay more taxes following revelation of their tax practices in the UK even where there was no allegation of breach of tax rules (Neville & Treanor, 2012). Although the Government and Parliament are ultimately responsible for the failings of the tax rules, yet, the real question from the perspective of CSR must be whether it is ethical for a company to aggressively exploit regulatory loopholes to the extent that it pays no taxes whatsoever.
Clearly, there is a fundamental difference between sustainability reporting and more conventional informational regulation models such as TRI and even the EU EMAS, that is, its essentially voluntary nature so that there is no “regulator” or institution through which reported information is filtered. Nevertheless, information in sustainability reports can arguably be used in a similar way to bring pressure on companies to change their attitudes and behaviour. The main difficulty with this appears to be issues of credibility of reports such that critics dismiss reports as a whole rather than critically evaluate their contents. Most surveys of reports are very general, seeking merely to evaluate methods and patterns of reporting rather than drawing conclusions from their actual contents (KPMG, 1997; Ernst & Young 2007). While conclusions from this may in themselves be damning, yet, by tarring all reports with the same brush, there is no incentive for individual companies to do better; or recognition of those adopting best practices in their reporting by using the GRI reporting principles ostensibly ensuring consistency and comparability of their reports. This is underscored by the UNEP/ KPMG (2006:6) report’s opposition to “the position that classifies all sustainability reports as “greenwash” and therefore, as fundamentally flawed, subjective, manipulative and untrustworthy.” 
Indeed, even where reports are merely “greenwashing”, the potential still exists for imaginative use of its contents for purposes of informational regulation.  For companies, publishing reports is not an end in itself, but is aimed at advancing a corporate strategy to engage relevant stakeholders to achieve certain outcomes. To realise their aim, the contents need to either be believed as true, or be impossible to positively controvert or raise reasonable doubts about. Raising awareness about their falsity therefore diminishes their usefulness. There is also the possibility of formally holding companies to account for false statements.  Thus, both the general public and other organised stakeholders such as the media and the NGO community can play a key role as watchdogs.  This will be no more than the role they currently play in naming and shaming through various reports, campaigns and protests, or successfully lodging formal complaints against errant companies involved in unsustainable practices, or “greenwashing”. For instance, in 2008, the World Wide Fund (WWF) was able to successfully challenge a Shell advertisement branding its Canadian tar sands operations as sustainable, with the British Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). The WWF stated that this sent a strong signal about the unacceptability of “greenwashing”, then disseminated this ruling through an advertisement campaign (Hickman, 2008). Similarly, ASA upheld a public complaint about Toyota’s advert that their Lexus RX 400 was "perfect for today's climate … [and] makes environmental, and economic, sense" as breaking truthfulness and environmental claims (Sky News, 2008).  Similar complaints against Saab automakers and easyJet airlines about environmentally cleaner claims have also been upheld (BusinessGreen, 2008) The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission also held that claims by the Goodyear tyre company in an advert that its Eagle LS2000 tyre range produced fewer CO2 emissions were unsubstantiated and in breach of the Trade Practices Act and ordered the company to partially reimburse its customers (McCulloch, 2008). As more awareness about “greenwashing” is created, some countries are tightening their advertising rules, and professional bodies providing guidance on sustainability communications (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2008; Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman’s Office, 2007; Chartered Institute of Public Relations, 2007).
From the analysis above, a holistic approach to the evaluation of reports, including apparent shortcomings can produce useful insights which can form the basis for both formal and informal information regulation. For instance, the fact that companies fail to use reporting guidelines, have external auditors, fail to present quantifiable data, or have negative disclosures all go to paint a picture of that company which can be utilised by activists and other stakeholders. More importantly, where actual misstatements are made, formal measures can be adopted to make companies accountable. In the next section we explore some of the frameworks that can be employed to ensure such accountability. 
Sustainability Reports:  Frameworks for Accountability on False and Misleading Statements 
There are undoubtedly a range of mechanisms that be utilised to hold corporations accountability for false and misleading statements in sustainability reports. This paper identifies and recommends the following four frameworks: information regulation at domestic level; green and ethical investment; transnational- OECD national contact points, and multilateral lending Institutions.
Information Regulation at Domestic Level Approach
In most countries including those in Africa, companies incur liabilities (civil and criminal) for making false and misleading financial statements. For instance, in Nigeria, Under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rules and Regulations 2000 (as amended) made pursuant to the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 1999,  the SEC is statutorily empowered to prevent and deal with cases of false and misleading financial statements by companies registered in Nigeria. Sanctions for false reporting or misstatement in financial reports are directed at both the company and its officers, and the auditors. These include payment of fines, suspension of officers, managers and directors of the company from operating or being employed in the capital market, or holding any directorship position in a Nigerian company; payment of fines by conniving accountancy firms; and possible referral of individuals to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for investigation and prosecution (Angahar, 2012).
Underlying this is the fact that the right to know by shareholders and consumers respectively encompasses the right to know the truth to be able to make wise and informed decisions. This should also be the case for environmental and social reporting as stakeholders deserve to know the truth of what companies are doing in their areas of operations.  Consequently, information regulation can be extended to hold companies, and auditors of their reports, accountable for false and misleading statements in sustainability reports. Indeed, John Ruggie’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy framework” (UNHRC, 2011) particularly calls on governments to protect human rights through the use of legislation.  Such legislation will strengthen not just regulatory agencies, but also civil society organisations in their bid to hold corporations accountable. If both traditional sanctions, as well as innovative ones like self-advertisements through public withdrawal of statements and apologies are employed, in light of our discussions on the stakeholder and legitimacy theories, such risks will counteract to some extent the strategic corporate reputational advantage in making misleading or false statements. To reduce the evidential burden on regulators and other stakeholders, the onus of establishing the truthfulness of statements should be on the one whom so alleges- the company.
2. Green and Ethical Investment Approach
Whether within the narrow construct of green investment – investing in reduction of greenhouse gas and other pollutants; or a broader approach that includes social concerns (ethical or socially responsible investment), a growing body of vocal green or ethical investors are integrating sustainability concerns in their investment choices and requiring information on environmental and social aspects of company operations. For instance, shareholders at a Washington DC Newmont Mining Annual General Meeting questioned its management and Board of Directors about operational and reputational risks that the company faces in Peru over failure to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of local communities. They also requested ‘additional disclosure on the company’s environmental and social guidelines and practices, including Board oversight of these issues’ (Christian Brothers Investment Services, Earthworks, and Maryknoll Sisters 2012).
 Indeed, there are now Green Banks such as the Green Investment Bank (headquartered in Edinburgh) established by the United Kingdom government in 2012 to finance projects aimed at environmental protection and preservation (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2011). This affects the core area of businesses as it has implications for investment decision-making and consumer choices and can therefore be utilised as a form of informal and indirect information regulation.  However, this approach will be most effective if such misleading statements are verified either through the formal process above, or informally by civil society organisations. 

3. Transnational- OECD National Contact Points 
Owing to weak domestic regulatory systems, transnational opportunities for accountability are crucial within the context of Africa. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises which promote such issues as human rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption,  offers a unique platform through its National Contact Points (NCPs), established as a complaints mechanism for aggrieved parties,  for stakeholders to hold companies accountable for false and misleading sustainability statements. Under the Guidelines, Multinational Enterprises cannot “make representations or omissions … that are deceptive, misleading, fraudulent or unfair.” This recognises that  consumers increasingly have an interest in “a broad range of economic, social and environmental issues” which impact on “their choices [for] goods and services”; and therefore deceptive, misleading, fraudulent and other unfair commercial practices can distort markets at the expense of both the consumer and responsible enterprises (OECD, 2011: 82; 88). Under the Specific Instances procedure, the NCPs can consider allegations that the behaviour or activity of a Multinational is inconsistent with the OECD Guidelines. Where the NCP agrees to take on a case, it will mediate, conciliate or investigate the alleged breaches and make a determination whether or not the company is in breach of the Guidelines. 
The importance of this mechanism for false statements is highlighted in a complaint brought before the United Kingdom’s and Netherland’s NCPs, by Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth (FoE) International, and FoE Netherlands against Shell Nigeria (OECD Watch, 2011). The complainants’ allegation in the context of this paper is that Shell violated relevant provision of the Guidelines by making false, misleading and incomplete statements about incidents of sabotage to its operations and sources of pollution in the Niger Delta, and their clean-up operations, the effect of which was that victims were unable to claim appropriate compensation under Nigerian Laws. The complainants support these allegations by relying on evidence from the 2011 UNEP Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland (2011) which contradicts Shell’s communications on these issues. Contrary to Shell’s communications and statements (Shell Dialogues Webchat, 2011), the report, found among other things, that Shell’s own internal procedures were not applied, and that ten out of the fifteen investigated sites which Shell records show as having completed remediation, still had pollution exceeding Shell (and government) remediation closure values. It also found that Shell’s new Remediation Management System which was an improvement still did not meet local regulatory requirements or international best practices. 
Although the Final Statement of the NCP fell short of the expectations of the complainants by not holding Shell accountable, it nevertheless recognised that  “Shell management should have had a more cautious attitude about the percentage of oil spills caused by the sabotage," as the data they are based on is "not absolute". It went further to make recommendations to Shell regarding its reporting practices.
In spite of this case, and although the NCPs have been active in recent times, unfortunately, it has been poorly utilised by stakeholders from Africa despite obvious serious breaches of the Guidelines by companies operating in the continent (OECD Watch, 2011).  This may be attributable to the fact that decisions or final statements of the NCPs, which are not judicial bodies, are not binding, enforceable, or appealable. Recommendations by the NCPs for improvement of compliance with the OECD Guidelines are also not subject to follow-up or monitoring to ensure compliance. 
These are clearly significant limitations to the NCP complaints mechanism, and justify some of the criticisms against CSR as ‘lacking teeth’. Some limited developments such as in the United Kingdom’s NCP, where there is now a Review Committee to which complainants may request a review of a case on procedural grounds, is aimed at addressing some of these concerns. However, while clearly imperfect, even in its current form, the NCP can be a useful mechanism for information regulation, especially in light of the reputational risks companies face from a determination of the NCP if well publicised.
4. Multilateral Lending Institutions Approach
Multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank and the International Financial Institutions (IFC) provide funds that finance some of the projects undertaken by companies especially those in the extractive sector. These multilateral lending institutions have mechanisms in place that require borrowing companies to comply with environmental, social and human rights laws and standards of those of the host countries in the lending contracts which bind them to comply with the safeguard policies of the World Bank or the performance standards of the International Financial Corporation (IFC).   Furthermore, there are complaints mechanisms such as the Inspection Panel of the World Bank and the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman of the IFC and Multilateral Investment Guarantees that allow affected communities to file claims alleging breach of the environmental and social standards of these lending institutions. The complaints mechanisms also determine the multilateral lending institutions compliance with their own polices and guidelines for monitoring compliance of funded projects with the policies. 
It is not a far stretch therefore to recommend that these institutions also include accuracy of information in sustainability reports of borrowing companies as pre-requisite of the loan and a ground for access to the complaints mechanisms. This fits in directly with the monitoring of compliance with the institutions policies on environmental and social issues (Alfredson & Ring, 2001; Suzuki & Nanwani, 2005; Dysart, Murphy, & Chayes, 2003). 
Conclusion
The paper has argued that despite the shortcomings in sustainability reports, under the right framework, it can be utilised as a tool for corporate accountability in Africa. This will help strengthen the operation of CSR on the continent by ensuring that companies are unable to claim false reputational advantages within the context of voluntary CSR. The paper has suggested four main frameworks within which such accountability can take place. However, this is far from a panacea for the ineffectual CSR on the continent and would indeed need the right combination of legal and extra- legal measures to have a meaningful impact. Crucially, success relies largely on the political will of African governments in regulating economically sensitive industries through this form of accountability. This is far from guaranteed. Moreover, civil society groups will have to battle the much more powerful corporations for the initiative in controlling the corporate message to the public.  
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